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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY RODGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ANNIE N. HANSEN and
ALBERT J. HANSEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15334

Defendants and Respondents.)

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 76(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respondents Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen respectfully
petition this Court for a rehearing in the above entitled
case.

This petition is based upon the following reasons:
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arises from the purchase of certain real

property located in Salt Lake County.

The original deed to

the property which was executed in 1944 listed Myrtle Neil
and respondents as joint tenants.

Mrs. Neil's successor,

appellant here, brought suit after Mrs. Neil's death seeking
to quiet title in herself.

Appellant alleged that the deed

had been intended to create a mortgage as between Mrs. Neil
and the Hansens.

The Hansens denied this allegation, saying
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that the deed accurately reflected the true relationship of
the parties.
The trial court found that the parties to the deed
did not intend to create a mortgage.

By its Opinion dated

May 23, 1978, this Court reversed and found that certain
receipts signed by Mrs. Hansen acknowledging Mrs. Neil's
"payment on home" were "clear and convincing" evidence of
the existence of a mortgage.

The Court also held that the

statute of limitations did not begin to run until Mrs. Neil's
possession of the property was terminated by her death.
POINT I
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT FULLY ADJUDICATE THE
CONTROVERSY. THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THE
OBLIGATION SECURED BY THEIR "MORTGAGE".
This Court's Opinion dated May 23, 1978, states,
in part:
We conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Hansen have
an equitable mortgage on the property
in the amount of $1,055 • • • (Opinion p. 3)
The decision does not address its elf to the question of whether
respondents are entitled to interest on this sum.

Respondents

believe that if this Court now refuses to address this issue,
sale of the premises will be further delayed until the matter
can be brought before the Court by subsequent litigation.
Respondents respectfully suggest that in the interest of
judicial economy the issue should be settled now, by this
Court.
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The legal rate of interest for the loan or
forebearance of money, goods or things in
action shall be six percent per annum.
The acknowledgment of the fact that as between Mrs. Neil and
respondents there existed a contract whereby the Hansens
would lend Mrs. Neil money and she would repay them is
implicit in this Court's holding that respondents' interest
in the subject property is that of a mortgage.

There is no

evidence that an interest rate was ever agreed upon.

Thus,

the case falls squarely within the rule of Section 15-1-1,
supra.

Respondents are therefore entitled to interest on

the principal amount of the alleged loan from 1944 to the
present.
Furthermore, since this is an equitable action,
respondents ask the Court to consider that the appellant
and her predecessor have had interest-free use of the "loan"
proceeds for almost 35 years and that the house purchased
with respondents' money has increased several fold in value.
Thus, absent payment of interest, appellant will realize a
windfall upon the sale of the house.
Respondents therefore respectfully suggest to the
Court that it would be inequitable to deny them interest on
their "investment".
POINT II
THIS COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL MRS. NEIL'S DEATH.
In its decision this Court held that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until Mrs. Neil's death since
-3-
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she was in possession of the premises until that time.
Although appellant had previously argued that .Laches was
inapplicable where a joint tenant was in possession, her
sole argument concerning the statute of limitations was that
it is inapplicable to a quiet title action.
Brief, pp. 16-17.)

(See Appellant's

Appellant never argued that the running

of the statute was tolled until death of the tenant in
possession.

Thus, the Court adopted a theory never raised

by appellant, and to which respondents never had a chance
to respond.

Respondents believe that they should be heard

on this issue and that the Court should reverse itself for
the following reasons:
1.
of law.

The Court's ruling violates accepted principles

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that

where the acts of one co-tenant constitute an ouster of
another co-tenant, the statute of limitations for purposes
of establishing adverse possession begins to run on the date
of ouster.

Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542

(1948); Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal Co., 48 Utah 490, 160
P. 444 (1916); Mccready v. Frederickson, 41 Utah 388, 126 P,
316 (1912).
In Mccready v. Fredericksen, supra, the court, quoting
a decision of Justice Taft, stated that an ouster is accomplished where one co-tenant "bring[s) it home" to another
co-tenant that his interest is adverse.

126 P. at 320.

Similarly, in Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley, supra, the court
stated that the statute would begin to run from the date of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
~4Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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the repudiation of the interests of the co-tenant.

160

P. at 446.
Thus, as a general principle, where one co-tenant
seeks to quiet title against another, the period of limitations
begins to run when the plaintiff becomes aware of the defendants
adverse interest.
As the Court's Opinion notes, Mrs. Neil knew as
early as 1958 that the Hansens claimed a fee rather than a
mortgage interest in two-thirds of the property.
Opinion, p.

(See

2.) Thus, the limitations period began to run

no later than 1958.

It is therefore clear that the Court

was incorrect in ruling that Mrs. Neil and her successor
were not barred from bringing this action.
2.

The Court's reasoning was erroneous.

The Court

stated that the period of limitations did not begin to run
until Mrs. Neil's death because,
The burden on Mrs. Neil to initiate legal action
can be no greater than the burden on the Hansens
to establish their claim to the property.
(Opinion, p. 3.)
There are two weaknesses in this position:

First,

since the Hansens had previously agreed to Mrs. Neil's
possession, there was no reason why they should have attempted
to quiet title against her, particularly in view of the fact
that as a co-tenant, Mrs. Neil had a possessory interest in
the property.
Second, even if it is assumed that both parties had
the same burden to quiet title to the property, it does not

-5-
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follow that the statute did not run.

On the contrary, the

only logical conclusion would be that after expiration of
the statutory period, neither could quiet title -- not
that both could.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT AS BETWEEN MRS. NEIL AND
THE HANSENS A MORTGAGOR-MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED
The Court found that the existence of the receipts
showing "payment [s] on the house" was "clear and convincing"
evidence of the existence of a mortgage.

Respondents believe

that the Court confused the concept of an obligation relating
to real property with the concept of an interest in real
property created to secure payment of that obligation.
A mortgage is created in two steps.
usually

mortgagee gives consideration
loan.

First, the

in the form of a

Second, the mortgagor conveys an interest in real

property to the mortgagee for the purpose of securing payment
of the underlying obligation.

Thus, it has been stated:

[A] mortgage is always created by the act
or agreement of the parties and stands as
security for the performance of an obligation or the payment of a debt.
59 C. J. S., Mortgages, § 9 (emphasis added).
In the instant action, this Court found that the
existence of the receipts was clear and convincing evidence
of the existence of a mortgage.
appears to have been as follows:

Thus, the Court's logic
Mrs. Neil was indebted~

the Hansens for repayment of the money they had spent in
purchasing the house.

Therefore, the Han sens held a mortgage

notSponsored
a fee
interest.
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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The fallacy in this reasoning is that while the
receipts may well show the existence of an obligation, they
can hardly be said to rise to the dignity of "clear and
convincing" evidence of the existence of an agreement to
reconvey the property to Mrs. Neil upon payment of the
obligation.

Indeed, no evidence exists as to the existence

of such an agreement.

Thus, the Court's disregarding of the

trial court's finding of fact on this issue was improper.
Respondents respectfully suggest to the Court that
its decision on this issue sets an unfortunate precedence in
two respects:

First, it establishes the principle that this

court may freely disregard a determination of fact regarding
the issue of intent which was made by the trier of fact.
Second, it appears to adopt the rule that the existence of
a mortgage is presumed where evidence of an indebtedness
arising from the purchase of real property is adduced.

Thus,

whereas in general a deed absolute may only be altered by
clear and convincing evidence, where the deed is obtained by
one co-tenant with the understanding that the other will
reimburse him for all or part of the purchase price, the
burden is on the purchaser to show that the deed accurately
reflects the intention of the parties.

Such a rule must

surely call into question the validity of many deeds heretofore
executed in this State.
Appellants believe that the Court's decision is a
departure from its general policy of upholding the clear
-7-
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language of deeds, and that it should therefore reconsider
this issue.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners/respondents believe that the Court should
rehear this case for several reasons.
First, the issue of interest on the alleged mortgage
was left unresolved.

If the Court fails to resolve this

question, further litigation and a possible subsequent appeal
may be required.
Second, the Court erred in ruling that as between
co-tenants the statute of limitations does not begin to run
for the adjudication of adverse claims until the death of
the tenant in possession.

By contrast, the law is well-

established that the statute begins to run from the date of
notice of the adverse claim.
Third, the Court also erred in holding that proof of
an obligation arising from purchase of real property is clear
and convincing evidence of the existence of a mortgage to
secure payment of that obligation.

In reality, there was

ample evidence that an obligation existed, but little or no
eviden~e that the debt was secured by a mortgage or provisional

conveyance.
Respondents urge the Court to reconsider these issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

,;:;Jlt,1

day of July, 1978.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

4

?
.
lt-H/n/j)
~~
Ste~. Gunn '

Attorneys for Respondents
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-_1_s_o_o~~.-.....
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
A copy of the foregoing Respondents' Petition for
Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid and properly addressed,
to Gordon L. Roberts and Stephen K. Schroeder, Parsons, Behle

& Latimer, 79 South State Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake
city, Utah

84147 on this

~day

of July, 1978.
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